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REC T CASES
of the possessor,1 7 the social value of the primary purpose of the
conduct,' 8 and the cost of avoiding the injury.' 9
The superiority of the reasonable use rule warrants its adoption
in Kentucky. The rule protects each landowner by taking his interests
into consideration and protects the interests of society in assuring that
land will be developed for that activity which has the greatest utility.
20
This is in contrast with the common enemy and civil law rules, which
arbitrarily protect the interests of one landowner at the expense of the
other, and can conceivably work against the interests of society.
2 '
The rule in Kentucky which subjects railroads to liability for
obstruction of surface water, caused by negligence in the construction
or maintenance of embankments and culverts, is subject to some of the
same disadvantages as the civil law and common enemy rules;22 there-
fore the reasonable use rule should also be adopted in respect to rail-
roads.
Thomas H. Burnett
CONSTrrrmONAL LAW-%CnmNAL PnocE nRE-FEDmiAL INJuNCnON WmL
NOT IssuE TO PRomrr WnrAr EvuENcE iN STATE CouRTs-New York
police armed with an ex parte court order- tapped petitioner's tele-
phone. The petitioner, charged with the commission of several felonies,
sought injunctive relief against Bronx County, the District Attorney
and others to prevent introduction of wiretap evidence in state
1
7 Priest v. Boston & M.R.R., 71 N.H. 114, 51 Ad. 667 (1901). Under the
reasonable use rule, as stated by the Restatement, Torts § 833 (1988), if
defendants interference is unintentional, the rule governing negligent, reckless
and ultrahazardous conduct is applied.
18 Restatement, Torts §§ 827-28 (1938).
19 Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
20 Ibid.
21 Kinyon & McClure, supra note 2, at 905-08.
22 Once the railroad has knowledge of the interference with surface water
caused by negligence in construction of the embankment, any subsequent inter-
ference is intentional and should be treated as such.
' Art. 1, § 12 of the New York Constitution permits the interception of
telephonic communications upon issuance of an ex parte court order. This con-
stitutional provision is implemented by N.Y. Code Crim. P. § 818(a).
The New York statute has been criticized for making authorizations to violate
federal law and denying its citizens the protection of a federal right. Even
proponents of restricted wiretapping criticize the New York law since any officer
above the rank of sergeant may make application to any judge so that all applica-
tions could be channeled through a willing judge. Note, 31 N.Y.L.J. 197, 204
(1956). See also Dash, Knowlton & Schwartz, The Eavesdroppers 85-166 (1959),
or complete coverage of the wiretapping problem in New York and other so-
called "permissive jurisdictions." They divide jurisdictions into three categories:
(1) Permissive-those in which wiretapping is expressly allowed to some extent,
2 Prohibition-those in which wiretapping is expressly forbidden, and (3) Virgin
-those which have no pertinent legislation on the subject.
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criminal proceedings. Relief was denied by the district court2 but the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted a temporary stay
pending the appeal. 3 On appeal the stay was vacated, and the Second
Circuit held that although introduction of wiretap evidence constituted
a federal crime, the federal courts should refrain from intervention
in state criminal proceedings. 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held: Affirmed in a per curiam decision on the basis of Schwartz v.
Texas5 and Stefanelli v. Minard.6 Justice Douglas, with whom the Chief
Justice concurred, dissenting. Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650
(1961).
Since the enactment of section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act in 1 934,
7 wiretap evidence and evidence obtained through wiretap
leads have been excluded in the federal courts.8 State courts have
not considered themselves bound by section 605 and wiretap evidence
has generally been held by them to be admissible. 9 The issue first
2 Pugach v. Sullivan, 180 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. N.Y. 1960). Bryan, J., ruled
that although the introduction of wiretap evidence in the petitioner's criminal
trial would be a criminal violation of § 605 of the Federal Communications Act,
the question of whether such evidence should be admitted is left to the states to
determine and the "federal courts should not exercise their equity power to dis-
turb the delicate balance of our federal system .. " Id. at 71.
3 Pugach v. Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1960). Judge Medina dis-
tinguished Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), and relied heavily on
Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), in ruling that a federal injunction
should issue since a violation of federal law in deprivation of petitioner's rights
would otherwise result in irreparable injury from which the petitioner would
have little recourse.4 Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960). The court sitting en
bane under the authority of Stefanelli v. Minard, supra note 3, refused to inter-
vene in state court criminal proceedings. Three judges favored the majority while
Judge Waterman concurred on the ground that state judges would not transgress
their oath to uphold the Federal Constitution and the laws of the United States
by admitting wiretap evidence in violation of the federal law. Justice Clark in a
strong dissent reaffirmed the views of Judge Medina.
5 8344 U.S. 199 (1952).
6342 U.S. 117 (1951).
748 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958). It provides:
[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communications and divulge . . . such intercepted communications to
any person; and no person not being entitled thereto . . . shall divulge
or publish the existence, contents, [or] substance...
Violation of § 605 is made a criminal offense under § 501 of the Federal Com-
munications Act. 48 Stat. 1100 (1934), as amended 68 Stat. 30 (1954), 47 U.S.C.
§ 501 (1958), provides for a fine of not more than $10,000 or not more than two
years' imprisonment or both. Oddly enough, there have been only three con-
victions and none of these has been for violations by either federal or state law
enforcement officers. See Massicot v. United States, 254 F.2d 58 (5th Cir.
1958); Massengale v. United States, 240 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1957).
8 For a general discussion of the development of § 605 in the federal courts,
see Moreland, Modem Criminal Procedure, ch. 9 (1959); Dash, Knowlton &
Schwartz, The Eavesdroppers 383-442 (1959); Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eaves-
dropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 391 (1960).
9 People v. Vuriano, 5 N.Y.S.2d 391, 157 N.E.2d 857 (1959); Commonwealth
v. Voci, 393 Pa. 404, 143 A.2d 652 (1958); Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa. 532,
112 A.2d 379 (1955).
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reached the Supreme Court in Schwartz v. Texas,10 where, in refusing
to reverse a state conviction, the Court held that "section 605 applies
only to the exclusion in federal court proceedings of evidence obtained
and sought to be divulged in violation thereof; it does not exclude
such evidence in state court proceedings."" The Court drew an
analogy to Wolf v. Colorado,'2 where it had refuseb to impose upon
the states the federal exclusionary rule announced in Weeks v. United
States,'1 pertaining to evidence obtained by unlawful search and sei-
zure. But much of the rationale in the Schwartz case was disturbed by
the language of the Chief Justice in Benanti v. United States:14
[W]e find that Congress, setting out a prohibition in plain terms, did
not mean to allow state legislation which would contradict that sec-
tion and that policy.'
5
Although in Benanti the Court merely refused to permit state officials
to introduce wiretap evidence in federal court secured under a state
ex parte order, the decision raised doubts as to the propriety of the
Schwartz holding and the validity of statutes which authorized the
violation of federal law.'
In the principal case, Pugach alleged that the introduction of
wiretap evidence by the defendants would deprive him of his statutory
rights,'17 that he had no adequate remedy at law, and that if relief
10344 U.S. 199 (1952).
11Id. at 203.
12338 U.S. 2.5 (1949). The Court was specifically faced with the problem
of whether due process required a reversal of a state conviction because evidence
was admitted which had been obtained by an unlawful search and seizure. It
held that "the fourteenth amendment did not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Id. at 33.
13232 U.S. 383 (1913). A marshall searched the defendant's room without
a warrant and evidence seized was introduced against him. The Court reversed
the conviction holding that it was error not to return the items seized upon the
defendant's seasonable request.
14855 U.S. 96 (1957).
15 Id. at 105.
'1 In In re Interception of Tel. Communications, 9 Misc.2d 121, 170 N.Y.S.2d
84 (1958), Hofstadter, J., refused to issue an exparte order on the ground that
the New York statute was invalid and that he would become an accessory before
the fact to the perpetration of a federal crime. See also Application for Intercep-
tion of Tel. Communication, 198 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1960), where Judge Davidson
refused to issue further orders since the federal decisions had held the use of
wiretap evidence unlawful, even though obtained pursuant to the New York
statute.
17 The District Court ruled that jurisdiction lay under the Civil Bights Act,
68 Stat. 1241 (1957), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958), amending 66 Stat. 932 (1948),
which provides for federal relief against denial of equal rights under federal law
by state officials, and under 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958) which
provides a federal remedy where citizens have been deprived of federal rights
pursuant to state action. Pugach v. Sullivan, 180 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
In McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1951), petitioner's claim
for injunctive relief against the use of wiretap evidence in state criminal pro-
ceedings was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 62 Stat. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
(Footnote continued on next page)
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were denied, he would suffer irreparable injury.' s Conceeding that
the divulgence of wiretap evidence, even in a state court, would con-
stitute a federal crime, the lower courts nevertheless refused to inter-
vene in the state criminal proceeding on the ground that the present
facts called for the exercise of the court's equitable discretion in
denying the requested relief.19 The Second Circuit relied primarily
on the authority of Stefanelli v. Minard,20 where the Supreme Court
had refused injunctive relief against the use of evidence secured by
means of an unlawful search and seizure in a state criminal proceed-
ing. There Justice Frankfurter had warned against tampering with
the balance between the federal and state courts. Intervention into
the state criminal proceedings, he said, would "expose every state
criminal proceeding to insupportable disruption ... [and] would in-
vite a flanking movement against the system of State courts by resort
to the federal forum .... 21
Chief Justice Warren, Justice Douglas, and Judges Clark and
Medina have strongly supported the petitioner's views. Their dis-
agreement with the majority's affirmance may be summarized in
three arguments. First, it was contended that the Schwartz case was
severely restricted, if not overruled, by the Benanti decision,'22 and that
the statute under which the evidence had been obtained was invalid
since it affirmatively authorized the interception of communications,
a field which Congress had pre-empted. 3 Secondly, it was argued that
the Stefanelli decision should not be controlling since in that case the
violation of federal law had occurred before the trial, no federal crime
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
§ 1331 (1958), was held inapplicable because the claim was less than $3,000.
Even though the court concluded that the petitioner had shown a state custom
or usage in violation of his federal rights, the court denied jurisdiction under the
Civil Bights Act on the ground that § 605 of the Federal Communications Act
did not provide a constitutional right, nor for the protection of equal rights of
citizens. See also Voci v. Farkas, 144 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1956), where the
court granted injunctive relief against the use of wiretap evidence in the state
proceeding for the suspension of petitioner's license. Upon finding that irreparable
injury would follow if relief were denied, jurisdiction was not put into issue.
18 See Pugach v. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 68 n.1, where the court notes
the irreparable injury which Pugach would suffer, such as the loss of his license
to practice law, the loss of a liquor license plus the loss of several personal rights.
-19 Anadditional reason for the court's holding was the traditional reluctance
of equity to enjoin the commission of a crime based on the policy of preserving the
right to a trial by jury. Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960). The
validity of this reason in the principal case is questionable. See 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
198, 200 (1961).
20 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
23- Id. at 123. In the Stefanelli decision the Court relied on Douglas v. City
of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), for the discretionary refusal by the Court to
exercise equitable power to interfere in state criminal proceedings.2 2 Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650 (1961) (dissenting opinion).2 3 Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739, 747 (2d. Cir. 1960) (dissenting
opinion).
[Vol. 50,
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was involved, no irreparable injury had been shown and the case was
an isolated instance of a fourth amendment violation. While in Pugach,
the petitioner sought to prevent a crime in futuro, irreparable injury
was clearly proven, and the acts sought to be enjoined constituted a
common violation of federal rights by law enforcement officials.
24
Thirdly, it was insisted that the federal courts should exercise their
equitable powers in preventing a federal crime,25 in protecting the
petitioner's statutory rights and in implementing the congressional
mandate against unlawful telephonic interception.
26
Instead of the flood of litigants to the federal forums as predicted
by Justice Frankfurter, Judge Clark, to the contrary, concluded that his
state brethren, along with state law enforcement officials, would wel-
come federal intervention which would give a definitive solution to
the wiretapping problem.27 The situation facing the Court was not
uncommon to many of the struggles between conflicting state and
federal policies.28 It is certainly questionable whether state judges
would rule inadmissible wiretap evidence which was expressly per-
mitted under a local statute. In the usual case the defendant is
unaware that wiretap evidence is being used against him; after it has
been introduced, federal relief would be precluded under Schwartz v.
Texas. If the state judges refused to follow the lead of the federal
courts, then the prediction of Justice Frankfurter might well come
true.
2 9
Conspicuously absent from Justice Douglas' dissent is the argu-
ment based on the "supremacy clause" 30 of the Constitution. Here the
New York statute expressly authorized the divulgence of wiretap
evidence in spite of the express congressional prohibition against such
divulgence. This argument was strongly hinted by Judge Waterman
in his concurring opinion in the Second Circuit decision.31 He believed
24 Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650 (1960) (dissenting opinion); Pugach
v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1960) (dissenting opinion); Pugach v.
Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1960).
25 See cases cited note 24 supra.
26 Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1960) (dissenting
opinion).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 See 8 U.O.L.A.L. Rev. 198 (1961).
30 U.S. Const. art. VI provides in part as follows:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not-
withstanding.
3ePugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir. 1960) (concurring
opinion). judge Waterman also admonished the United States district attorneys
that failure to prosecute admitted violations was an affront to the court.
19611
KEn-UcsY LAw JoumAL[
that state judges would not admit evidence into the record, the divul-
gence of which would violate federal law. To admit such evidence
the judge would have to disregard his sacred oath to uphold the United
States Constitution and the laws made pursuant thereto as the supreme
law of the land.32 In Pugach there was the clearest conflict between
federal law prohibiting the interception of telephonic communications
on the one hand, and on the other, a state constitutional provision and
statute authorizing such interceptions. It would seem from Pugach
that the Supreme Court was willing to turn a deaf ear to the state's
infringement of federal statutory rights and to disregard its staunch
enforcement of the concept of federal supremacy.
By affirming in Pugach on the authority of Schwartz, the Court
dispelled all hope that Schwartz might be overruled on the strength
of the Benanti decision. As of Pugach, wiretapping and the divulgence
of wiretap evidence while constituting a federal crime is nevertheless
admissible in state criminal proceedings at the state's discretion. For
all practical purposes, section 605 of the Federal Communications Act
has been reduced to a federal rule of evidence.33
The law, however, is not as well settled as it might seem. Two
months after Pugach, the Court handed down Mapp v. Ohio.34 In
overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 5 the Court held that the right of privacy
guaranteed under the fourth amendment is enforceable through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and that evidence
obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure is inadmissible in
state criminal proceedings. The effect Mapp will have on the wire-
tapping law is speculative. Since Wolf represented the foundation for
both Schwartz and Stefanelli, these decisions stand on shaky ground.
While it is arguable that Mapp need not have any particular bearing
on the wiretapping decisions because state infringement merely is in
violation of a federal statute and not a constitutional right, one should
382Ibid.
33 See Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View,
44 Minn. L. Rev. 891 (1960). Professor Kamisar takes the position that an
individual has more protection under § 605 from unlawful wiretappng than he
would if wiretapping came under the fourth amendment. In adition to the
criminal offense for violating § 605, civil damages are also available. Little, if any,
advantage could be gained by reversal of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928).
84 81 Sup. Ct. 1684 (1961). Police officials without permission and without a
warrant made a search of defendant's premises and found ponogaphic literature,
the possession of which constituted a crime. The conviction was affirmed by
the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court by-passed the first amendment question and
reversed on the ground that the search by the police without a warrant con-
stituted a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment. Justice Clark,
speaking for the court, noted the obvious futility of relegating the fourth amend-
ment to the protection of other remedies.
85 88 U.S. 25 (1949).
[Vol. 50,
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not forget the closeness of the Olmstead"6 decision where the Court
ruled that wiretapping fell outside the protection of the fourth amend-
ment. But is not wiretapping as great an intrusion on the right of
privacy as an unconstitutional search and seizure? Would the Court's
decision be the same as in Olmstead if it were to reappraise the issue?
One might anticipate that the Court will provide the answer to these
questions in the very near future.
The victory of Pugach may be short-lived. Law enforcement officials
may once again be compelled to fight twentieth century crime with
nineteenth century methods.37 Undoubtedly the battle over wiretap-
ping is just beginning. Many advocates urge as a solution to the prob-
lem what may be considered a middle-of-the-road position. While
urging on the one hand that the Supreme Court take the initiative in
enforcing the federal statute by ruling inadmissible such evidence
unlawfully obtained by state officials and violative of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, they also seek legislation by
Congress which would permit restricted and controlled wiretapping by
authorized officials in a limited number of situations such as espionage,
narcotics and kidnappings. Warrants should be required, and such
warrants should be issued only by a federal judge or a designated
member of the Federal Communications Commission. Such a statute
would enable law enforcement officials to use wiretapping, while at
the same time providing adequate safeguards to insure the protection
of constitutional and statutory rights38
K. Sidney Neuman
Loss OF CONSORTIUM TO WIFE CAUSED BY NEGIGENCE OF TmRD PA.IrY
-Plaintiff's husband, a fireman, was severely injured while attempting
to extinguish a fire caused by the defendant's negligence. Plaintiff
brought suit for loss of consortium. From a summary judgment dis-
missing her action, the plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed. Where a
wife's conjugal interest is invaded by the negligent act of a third party,
386Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The historic dissents
by Justices Holmes and Brandeis may well serve as a basis for overruling Olmstead
in a future decision. Justice Douglas, in particular, has continued to strive to
bring wiretapping within the protection of the fourth amendment. He states that
this would be an effective solution to the wiretapping problem only if Wolf v.
Colorado were reversed. Douglas, The Right of the People 150 (1952).
37 See Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View,
44 Minn. L. Rev. 835 (1960); Rogers, The Case for Wiretapping, 63 Yale L.J.
792 (1953).
38 See 100 Cong. Rec. 4156 (1954), where Senator McCarren discusses a bill
he introduced in the 83rd Congress. While the bill proposed a system similar to
that of New York, it did not restrict grants of warrants by federal officers and
was defeated.
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